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Krysten Rosen Moller

Krysten Rosen Moller focuses her practice on representing clients in internal investigations, government investigations, and follow-on civil litigation, with an emphasis on serving clients in the life sciences and healthcare industries.

Krysten assists companies with complex internal and government investigations covering a broad range of issues, including fraud and abuse, advertising and promotion, and bribery and corruption. Krysten has particular experience conducting targeted and efficient internal investigations and representing pharmaceutical and medical device companies against investigations from the Department of Justice or other government regulators. Krysten’s complementary litigation practice focuses on defending life sciences and healthcare companies in related litigation, including cases arising under the False Claims Act and other follow-on litigation arising from government investigations.

Krysten also counsels clients on compliance matters. She regularly represents companies negotiating HHS OIG Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) and advises companies on implementing and operating under CIAs. She has also conducted False Claims Act risk assessments and advised on other fraud and abuse issues.

The Coalition for Government Procurement and the National Defense Industrial Association filed an amicus brief in the consolidated Supreme Court cases United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc. and United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc. The brief urges the Court to hold, consistent with the decisions of multiple federal courts of appeals, that a defendant cannot be liable under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for “knowingly” submitting a “false” claim if (1) it acted in accordance with an objectively reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute, regulation, or contract provision and (2) there was no authoritative guidance warning it away from that interpretation.  The Amici are represented by Covington & Burling LLP. 

In SuperValu and Safeway, the Court is asked to resolve questions over the role that subjective intent plays in evaluating whether a defendant satisfies the FCA’s “knowledge” requirement.  Petitioners argue that a contractor can be liable under the FCA for submitting a claim that is premised on an objectively reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous legal provision if the contractor recognized that the provision could be interpreted a different way.  However, as the amicus brief explains, such a claim cannot be false for alleged noncompliance with the ambiguous legal provision that has not otherwise been clarified by authoritative guidance.  Nor can such a contractor knowingly submit a false claim just because it was aware that the legal obligation may be interpreted differently.Continue Reading Amici Curiae Submit Brief Urging Supreme Court to Adopt “Objectively Reasonable” FCA Knowledge Standard

On Thursday, September 15, 2022, an en banc panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument in the rehearing of an important case concerning the “knowledge” element of the False Claims Act—United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan, No. 20-2330.  The panel was active, posing numerous questions for both parties during the oral argument, which spanned approximately 94 minutes. The audio recording of this hearing is available here.

As Covington has reported in the past, this appeal concerns questions related to the scope of the False Claims Act’s “knowledge” requirement. In its January 25, 2022 decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal, finding that under the FCA “a defendant cannot act ‘knowingly’ as a matter of law if it bases its actions on an objectively reasonable interpretation of the relevant statute when it has not be warned away from the interpretation by authoritative guidance” and that “this objective standard precludes inquiry into a defendant’s subjective intent.”  United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC, 24 F.4th 340, 348 (4th Cir. 2022). That opinion was also subject to a strong dissent by Judge Wynn, which argued that the majority opinion disregarded two of the three FCA’s enumerated forms of knowledge (actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance), focusing only on the Safeco test for objective recklessness.Continue Reading En Banc Rehearing of Fourth Circuit Sheldon Decision Addresses FCA’s Falsity And Knowledge Requirements

On February 23, 2022, Gregory E. Demske, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General for HHS’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), provided opening remarks and answered questions during the Federal Bar Association’s annual Qui Tam Conference.  Mr. Demske spoke about OIG’s role in False Claims Act (“FCA”) enforcement and resolutions, and discussed enforcement priorities for the upcoming year.
Continue Reading Senior HHS Official Discusses Role of OIG in FCA Resolutions and Enforcement Priorities for 2022

On January 25, 2022, the Fourth Circuit joined the growing number of circuits to hold that under the False Claims Act, “a defendant cannot act ‘knowingly’ if it bases its actions on an objectively reasonable interpretation of the relevant statute when it has not be warned away from the interpretation by authoritative guidance” and that “this objective standard precludes inquiry into a defendant’s subjective intent.”  United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan, No. 20-2330, (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2022) (“Opinion”) at 12.
Continue Reading Fourth Circuit Sheldon Decision Confirms Objective Standard For Scienter Under FCA

When the United States government decides to intervene in False Claims Act litigation after initially declining intervention, it is not “déjà vu all over again.”  Instead, as one court has recognized, the “government is getting on a moving train,”[1] and it can only be permitted to “intervene at a later date” if it can show “good cause” for doing so.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).

On February 24, 2021, a Tennessee federal district court offered a pointed reminder of this principle when it denied a government motion to intervene in a qui tam suit after DOJ originally had declined to intervene six months earlier.  See U.S. ex rel. Odom v. Southeast Eye Specialists, No. 3:17-cv-00689 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2021).  In so ruling, the court vacated a magistrate judge’s Report & Recommendation (“R&R”), which found that DOJ had established “good cause” for intervention.  Although motions to intervene pursuant to Section 3730(c) are often granted, the recent order issued in U.S. ex rel. Odom v. Southeast Eye Specialists illustrates that the “good cause” showing is not a hollow requirement and that it can serve as a meaningful constraint on belated attempts by DOJ to intervene to pursue a case after initially declining to do so.Continue Reading False Claims Act Update: District Court Rejects DOJ Motion to Intervene for Lack of “Good Cause”

On February 27 and 28, 2020, Joseph H. (Jody) Hunt, Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Civil Division, and Michael Granston, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Commercial Litigation Branch, spoke about False Claims Act (“FCA”) enforcement at the Federal Bar Association’s annual Qui Tam Conference in Washington, D.C. They highlighted FCA enforcement priorities for 2020, and offered insights on the Department’s dismissal policy and cooperation policy – two topics that Deputy Associate Attorney General Stephen Cox also addressed in remarks earlier this year.
Continue Reading Senior DOJ Attorneys Speak About FCA Enforcement Priorities, Dismissal, and Cooperation