Last Monday, April 28, 2025, the House passed a bill titled Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security (“ROUTERS”) Act (H.R. 866), which directs the Secretary of Commerce to study national security risks and cybersecurity vulnerabilities “posed by consumer routers, modems, and devices that combine a modem and router, that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a covered country.”  Similar to some other recent supply chain requirements imposed on federal contractors, the bill defines “covered countries” by reference to 10 U.S.C. 4872, which prohibits the acquisition of sensitive materials from North Korea, Russia, Iran, and China.

In his remarks on the House floor, Representative Bob Latta (R-OH), who co-sponsored the bill alongside Representative Robin Kelly (D-IL), stated that the ROUTERS Act aims to protect U.S. national security from Chinese Communist Party-sponsored attacks on communications networks.  Specifically, Representative Latta highlighted that various agencies had reported on “how some Chinese Communist Party-sponsored hackers have used [] vulnerabilities” in routers and modems to “launch attacks.”  Noting that “companies with ties” to the Chinese Communist Party could be forced to support Chinese intelligence activities, Representative Latta added that a study of routers and modems—which he characterized as “key” in communication networks—is critical for Congress to understand the “scope and risk” of any security threats posed by such technologies “produced by companies with ties to foreign adversaries.”  He further stated that the ROUTERS Act built upon “bipartisan efforts to remove untrusted equipment from [American] communication systems,” referring specifically to the 2019 Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act (H.R. 4998), which prohibited the use of equipment from certain Chinese telecommunications companies in American networks.  Notably, the bill coincides with recently introduced legislation that would prohibit the use of adversarial technology in the U.S., such as the No DeepSeek on Government Devices Act (H.R. 1121).    

Although the ROUTERS Act’s likelihood of passage is unclear, if enacted, the Act would set the stage for additional future legislation similar to Congress’s 2019 ban of certain Chinese telecommunications systems, especially as the national security concerns underlying the ROUTERS Act and Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act continue to grow.  In this instance, government contractors can expect to face regulations and prohibitions similar to other supply chain rules that address information technology and cybersecurity risks from foreign adversaries.  We are monitoring such updates closely and will provide additional information as it becomes available.