On March 11, 2024 the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), released the much anticipated final version of its common Secure Software Development Attestation Form.  Finalization of the form is a notable development for developers of software that is sold to the U.S. Government for two reasons.  First, the form is expected to be used widely by Government agencies to fulfill requirements set forth in recent OMB memoranda for those agencies to ensure that the software they procure or use is secure by requiring attestations from software developers.  Second, as set forth under OMB guidance, final approval of the form by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) triggers a countdown wherein agencies need to begin collection of the forms within three months for “critical software” and within six months for all other software.

As we described in more detail in a prior post, OMB issued a memorandum in September 2022 that directed federal agencies to collect attestations from software developers that those developers adhere to certain secure software development practices described by NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SP 800-218) and the NIST Software Supply Chain Security Guidance (discussed here) (collectively, “NIST Guidance”).  “Software” is very broadly defined to include “firmware, operating systems, applications, and application services (e.g., cloud-based software), as well as products containing software.”  Covered software includes software that was developed or that underwent a major version change after September 14, 2022, as well as software that undergoes continuous updating.  OMB indicated in the memorandum that agencies would use a “common form” to collect these attestations. 

Although the requirements were initially slated to go into effect last year, OMB delayed the implementation in a subsequent memorandum that it issued in June 2023, which we discussed in another post.  As a result of the June 2023 memorandum, agencies are not required to comply with the requirements until a certain period after the common form was approved by OIRA.  Specifically, agencies must collect attestations for software developers within three months of the form’s approval for “critical” software, and within six months of the form’s approval and all other software within six months of the form’s approval. 

Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) are permitted under the current guidance, but acceptance of the POA&M is within an agency’s discretion, and agencies must specifically request extension of the deadline for attestation from OMB for that piece of software.  Agencies may also, in their discretion, choose to require the provision of additional materials, including software bills of materials (SBOMs). 

OMB has not released any updated guidance relating to secure software as of yet, and while an implementing FAR rule appears to be nearing completion of the interagency drafting and development process, it has not been released either.  Nonetheless, the conditions set forth in the June 2023 memorandum to start the three and six month clocks have now been met. 

Accordingly, software developers that sell products for end use by the U.S. Government are highly encouraged to assess their current state of compliance relative to the secure development practices now to identify any potential gaps that could cause concerns with customers and to begin addressing them.  Contractors are also encouraged to begin documenting the basis for the attestations that they will be required to make.

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Photo of Robert Huffman Robert Huffman

Bob Huffman counsels government contractors on emerging technology issues, including artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, and software supply chain security, that are currently affecting federal and state procurement. His areas of expertise include the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agency acquisition regulations governing…

Bob Huffman counsels government contractors on emerging technology issues, including artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, and software supply chain security, that are currently affecting federal and state procurement. His areas of expertise include the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agency acquisition regulations governing information security and the reporting of cyber incidents, the proposed Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program, the requirements for secure software development self-attestations and bills of materials (SBOMs) emanating from the May 2021 Executive Order on Cybersecurity, and the various requirements for responsible AI procurement, safety, and testing currently being implemented under the October 2023 AI Executive Order. 

Bob also represents contractors in False Claims Act (FCA) litigation and investigations involving cybersecurity and other technology compliance issues, as well more traditional government contracting costs, quality, and regulatory compliance issues. These investigations include significant parallel civil/criminal proceedings growing out of the Department of Justice’s Cyber Fraud Initiative. They also include investigations resulting from False Claims Act qui tam lawsuits and other enforcement proceedings. Bob has represented clients in over a dozen FCA qui tam suits.

Bob also regularly counsels clients on government contracting supply chain compliance issues, including those arising under the Buy American Act/Trade Agreements Act and Section 889 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, Bob advises government contractors on rules relating to IP, including government patent rights, technical data rights, rights in computer software, and the rules applicable to IP in the acquisition of commercial products, services, and software. He focuses this aspect of his practice on the overlap of these traditional government contracts IP rules with the IP issues associated with the acquisition of AI services and the data needed to train the large learning models on which those services are based. 

Bob writes extensively in the areas of procurement-related AI, cybersecurity, software security, and supply chain regulation. He also teaches a course at Georgetown Law School that focuses on the technology, supply chain, and national security issues associated with energy and climate change.

Photo of Ryan Burnette Ryan Burnette

Ryan Burnette is a government contracts and technology-focused lawyer that advises on federal contracting compliance requirements and on government and internal investigations that stem from these obligations. Ryan has particular experience with defense and intelligence contracting, as well as with cybersecurity, supply chain…

Ryan Burnette is a government contracts and technology-focused lawyer that advises on federal contracting compliance requirements and on government and internal investigations that stem from these obligations. Ryan has particular experience with defense and intelligence contracting, as well as with cybersecurity, supply chain, artificial intelligence, and software development requirements.

Ryan also advises on Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) compliance, public policy matters, agency disputes, and government cost accounting, drawing on his prior experience in providing overall direction for the federal contracting system to offer insight on the practical implications of regulations. He has assisted industry clients with the resolution of complex civil and criminal investigations by the Department of Justice, and he regularly speaks and writes on government contracts, cybersecurity, national security, and emerging technology topics.

Ryan is especially experienced with:

  • Government cybersecurity standards, including the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP); DFARS 252.204-7012, DFARS 252.204-7020, and other agency cybersecurity requirements; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publications, such as NIST SP 800-171; and the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program.
  • Software and artificial intelligence (AI) requirements, including federal secure software development frameworks and software security attestations; software bill of materials requirements; and current and forthcoming AI data disclosure, validation, and configuration requirements, including unique requirements that are applicable to the use of large language models (LLMs) and dual use foundation models.
  • Supply chain requirements, including Section 889 of the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act; restrictions on covered semiconductors and printed circuit boards; Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) restrictions; and federal exclusionary authorities, such as matters relating to the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC).
  • Information handling, marking, and dissemination requirements, including those relating to Covered Defense Information (CDI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).
  • Federal Cost Accounting Standards and FAR Part 31 allocation and reimbursement requirements.

Prior to joining Covington, Ryan served in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Executive Office of the President, where he focused on the development and implementation of government-wide contracting regulations and administrative actions affecting more than $400 billion dollars’ worth of goods and services each year.  While in government, Ryan helped develop several contracting-related Executive Orders, and worked with White House and agency officials on regulatory and policy matters affecting contractor disclosure and agency responsibility determinations, labor and employment issues, IT contracting, commercial item acquisitions, performance contracting, schedule contracting and interagency acquisitions, competition requirements, and suspension and debarment, among others.  Additionally, Ryan was selected to serve on a core team that led reform of security processes affecting federal background investigations for cleared federal employees and contractors in the wake of significant issues affecting the program.  These efforts resulted in the establishment of a semi-autonomous U.S. Government agency to conduct and manage background investigations.